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This paper examines irreversible decisions on innovative activities where it takes
time to complete an R&D project. The totala mountofR&Din vestments that
the rm needs to undertakeinor dertoo btain the breakthrough in the innovation
process is uncertain. R&D investments are limited by the restriction that they
must be self-nanced.
It is shown that R&D investmentsar e morev aluable when the level of uncertainty
is large. Especially,itisv ery attractive to undertake R&D investments if a project
faces many uncertainties during its ea rly phases.F urthermore we study how R&D
behavior is inuenced bydi erentlev els of the discount rate and the nancing
limit.Mo reover, the eectso f R&D subsidies, spillover benets and a payo that
decreases over time are analyzed.
JEL classication: 522, 621.
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1 Introduction
Recenty ears havewi tnessed the development of a large literature analyzing the incen-
tives for rmstope rform innovative activities. Besides the large stream of macroeco-
nomic publications on the so-called "endogenous growth theory" (see,e. g., Romer (1990a,
1990b), Grossman and Helpman (1990, 1991)), there exists a considerable amountofm i-
croeconomic contributions that can be subdivided in strategic and decision-theoretic
literature. The strategic literature aimsati nnovating behavior of rms while taking into
account the reactions of competitors. This stream of literature focusses on aspects of
rivalry,th us game-theoretic approaches (see, e.g., Reinganum (1985) and Tirole (1988)).
Within the decision-theoretic literature on innovation, dynamic R&D investmentis
treated as an optimal control problem facing a single rm. This kind of analysis ap-
plies most directly to situations in whicham onopolist undertakes a research project,
ane ntrepreneur pursues a new patentwi thout rivalry,orac ompetitive rm seeks an
improvedte chnology. Of particular importance in the decision-theoretic framework is
the assumption that the rm believes its choice of the level of R&D spending does not
inuence the R&D spending of its rivals. This assumption may be justied when there
are perhaps manyw ays of achieving the same innovation, so that the rm's rivals may
not be ini ts presentli ne of business (Kamien and Schwartz (1982), p. 107). Recentc on-
tributions within this area are Grossman and Shapiro (1986), Majd and Pindyck (1987)
and Giord (1992).
Besides performing R&D itself the rm has the possibilityofatec hnology transfer, but
also then it needs to have substantial inhouse capacityi n order to recognize,e valuate,
negotiate and nally adopt the technology potentiallya vailable from others. Moreover,
inhouse R&D has the additional advantage of facilitating better information ow from
the R&D laboratory to those who wouldha vetoim plement the new technology, and
from the latter to the former. Therefore R&D growth has not led to a comparable
process of market-baseddi vision of labor and the emergenceofspe cialized "innovation
suppliers". Firmsm akei nnovations largely on the basis of inhouse technology,butwi th
some contributions from other rms, and from public knowledge (Dosi (1988), p. 1130).
The purpose of this paper is to study optimal dynamic R&D behavior of a rm within
a decision theoretic framework. Completing the project requires investing in R&D. The
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actual total of R&D investments that needs to be undertaken to complete the project
is negatively correlatedwi th the present and future progress made by the rm's R&D
laboratory. Since this progress is hard to predict, the cost to obtain the innovation is in
general unknown. When after a while it turns out tobeto ex pensivetocom plete the
project, the rm can stop investing in it.
We conclude that an R&D project takes time to complete and is subject to cost uncer-
tainty. Pindyck (1993) distinguishes twot ypes of cost uncertainty. The rst iste chnical
uncertaintywhi ch relates to the physical dicultyofc ompleting a project: howm uch
time, eort and materials will ultimatelybereq uired. The second kind of uncertainty
relates to input costs, and ise xternal to what the rm does. It arises when the pricesof
labor, land, and materials needed to buildaproje ct uctuate considerably.
The cost uncertaintyofcom pleting an R&D projectism ainly of the technical type.
Therefore, since in thisc ontribution we explicitly want to focus on R&D investments,
wewi ll neglect input cost uncertainty.A sPi ndyck (1993) argues, technical uncertainty
can only be resolved by undertaking the project; actual costs and construction time
unfold as the project proceeds. These costs maybegr eater or less than anticipated if
impediments arise or if the work progresses faster than planned, but the total cost of
investmentisonl yk nown for certain when the project isc ompleted. In the model speci-
cation of Pindyck (1993), technical uncertainty is the same for each phase of the project.
However, in the beginning of an R&Dpr oject one is usually very uncertain about how
muchti me, eort and materials willbene ded to complete the project; in fact insom e
cases it is not even known whether the project can be realized at all. This implies that
technical uncertaintyi sv ery large when the projecti s far from being completed. This
uncertaintywi ll reduce whensom e research has been undertaken, or, in otherw ords,
investing time and eort in the projectre veals somei nformation about what exactly
is neededtodev elop the innovation. Hence, the leveloftec hnical uncertaintyi s larger
in early phases of an R&D project. Therefore, in this paper wem odify the model of
Pindyck (1993), where technical uncertaintyi s the same for each phase of the project, in
order to include the feature that working on the projectr educes the project's uncertainty.
In the model R&D investments are limited by the restriction that they must be self-
nanced. According to Kamien and Schwartz (1982) thisi sre alistic for the following
twore asons. First, the uncertainty associated with innovative activities is strong, and
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borrowing for risky projects is prohibitively expensive(Ge roski (1992)) since the out-
come of a risky project is uncertain and whenitfai ls itl eavesbe hind few tangible assets.
Second, the rm mayberel uctanttore veal detailed information about the proje ct that
would make it attractive to outside lenders, fearing its disclosure to potential rivals
(Kamien and Schwartz (1982), p. 128). These observations are supported by anecdot-
ical evidence and an empirical study of Guerard, Bean and Andrews (1987) who found
out that there is a lack of statistical signicance of R&D and external funds.
Besides determining the eects of the amount of uncertainty, the division of uncertainty
accross the dierent phases of the project, the levelofthedi scount rate and the nancing
restriction on R&Di nvestments, we also analyze the eects of three characteristics that
are typical for innovation projects. First, we study the eect of an investment grant. This
granti s donated to the rm by the governmenti n order to stimulate innovativeac tivities.
Second, we analyze what happens when spillover benets exist. Existence of spillover
benets captures the fact that knowledge is a nonrival input (Romer (1990a)) in the
sense that several rmsm ay put the same information to use simultaneously at no extra
cost. Here, the rm takes advantage of the more general forms of scientic and engineer-
ing knowledge generated outside the rm by competitors or universities.
Third, we analyze the eect that a decreasing value of a completed innovation over time
can have on the rm's innovative activities. This value is equal to the payo that ac-
crues to the rm after the innovation project is completed. This payo can decrease over
time, because, rst, the sooner the rm perf ects the device, the longer is the time period
that it captures monopoly rents. Second, the numberofcom petitors that already has
achieved the breakthrough in the innovation process will increase over time, implying
that competition in the market of the innovated product also increaseso ver time.
In Section 2 we develop the model, while the optimal investment rule isde rived in Section
3. Here weal so study how R&D investments depend on the amount of uncertainty, the
division of uncertaintyac cross the phases of the project, the level of the discount rate,
and the availability of funds. Section 4 treats the eects of an R&Di nvestmentgr ant,
spillover benets and a decreasing payo. The paper is concludedi nSe ction 5.
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2 The Basic Model
The problemofde termining optimal R&D investments over timei s a sequential invest-
ment problem. An R&D project takes timetocom plete, because during some time
investments inm achines, materials, human capital, etc., are needed in ordertodev elop
the innovation. The project generates no cash owasl ongasiti s not completed.
An R&D projecti s subject to technical uncertainty since it is not known beforehand
howm uch time, eort and materials willul timately be requiredtocom plete the project.
However, every time the rm invests, some information about these future costsi s re-
vealed. When, based on this new information, the rm concludesthatitistooe xpensive
to complete the project, itc an be stopped midstream.
Denote the actual total of R&D investments needed to complete the projectatti me t by
~K(t). Due to the technical uncertainty ~K is a random variablet hat cannot be observed
at time t. What is known at this timei s the rm'sex pectation about howm any R&D
investments are needed to obtain the innovation, whichi s equal to K(t)= E( ~K(t)). In
order tom ake things not too complicated, the value of a successful innovation, P ,is
assumedtobec onstant and known with certainty.
In Pindyck (1993) a general sequential investment problem (so, not only R&D but also,
e.g.,l arge construction works) is formulated subject to input cost uncertainty and tech-






where I(t) is the investmentatti me t,  is a parameter that is constanto ver time and
dw(t) is the increment of a Wiener process.
The project manager estimates the expected cost to completion, but due to the stochas-
tic term this value will be adjusted over time. This adjustmentisbase d on activities
in developing the project. Therefore, K can only change when the rm undertakes
somei nvestments. Thisi sbe cause as long as the rm does not invest in the project
no additional information about thi s project becomesa vailable, so that nothing changes
about the rm's expectation concerning future costs. Hence, here there isno"v alue of
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waiting".1
When the rm invests, the expectedc hange in K over an interval t equals  It, but
the realized change can be greaterorl ess than this, and K can even increase.A s the
project proceeds, progress willatti mes be slower and at times faster than expected. The
variance of ~K fallsas K falls, but the actual total amountofi nvestments is only known
when the project is completed.










Hence, the variance of dK=K increasesl inearly with I=K . This means that, if for dif-
ferent valuesof K a xed part of the expected total of investments is undertaken (i.e.
I=K is constant), then the uncertaintyconc erning the part that the expected total of
investment is reducedi s constant too. Therefore, under equation (1) it holds that tech-
nical uncertainty is the samef or all phases of the project.
However, for an R&D projecti t is in general the case that uncertaintyism uch larger
during early phases of the project; at the start it is usually not known at allho wm uch
time, eort and materials will ultimately be requiredtode velop the innovation, while
in the end iti sm oreorl ess clear what is left to be done.Thi si mplies that technical
uncertaintyisl arger when K is large than when K islo w. Hence, to make expression
(1) suitable for modelling R&D investments, wem ust modifyi tsuc h that the varianceof
dK=K is increasing in K if a xed part of the expected total of investment is undertaken.






where  is a positive constant. Weconc lude that nowte chnical uncertaintyi sm uch
larger during early phases of the project (i.e. K isl arge) if  is large.
1In case there is a positivev alue of waiting it is implied that undertaking investments nowin troduces
opportunity costs thata re ignored in the cl assical net presentv alue (NPV) rule. This failure of the
NPV criterion forms the key messageo f a stream of recentco ntributions in whichi t is argued that, due
to this positive option value of postponing investment, a project with a positiveNPVm ightsti ll be
uneconomical (see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994)).
7
For reasons already stated in the Introduction, R&D investments can only be nanced by
retained earnings. Ifw e dene R(R> 0 and constant) as the rm's prot ow before the
breakthrough in the innovation process, I(t)i sr estricted from aboveb y R. Knowledge
acquisition isal so irreversible, so the R&D investment at time t faces the constraint
0  I(t)  R: (4)
If we dene the discount rate to be r(r> 0 and constant), the problem is to nd a
stream of R&D outlays that maximizes the value of the innovation opportunitygi venb y












subject to expressions (3), (4)and K( ~T ) = 0.
Uncertaintyisrel ated to the progress made in completing the R&D project. Thisk ind
of uncertainty results from the inability to predict how dicult a project will be, and
this has nothing to do with the state of the overall economy. Therefore,i nourm odel
uncertaintyi sl argely diversiable, so that the discount rate equals the riskless rate.
In the next section wesol ve the basicm odel and study how sensitive R&D investments
are with respect to the division of uncertainty accross dierent phases of the project, the
overall level of uncertainty, the discount rate and the availability of funds. Moreover,
in Section 4 wee xtend this modelb yi ncluding somec haracteristics that are typical
for an R&Di nvestment problem, suchasi nvestment subsidies, spillover benets and a
decreasing payo over time.
3 Solving the Basic Model
Since the expected progress in the innovation process as wellasthec osts of investment
depend linearlyon I, the problem will have a "bang-bang" solution. Atan y pointintim e
the optimal R&D investment willbeei ther 0 or R.Asare sult, the optimal investment
rule reducestoac ritical cuto value for the expected total of R&D investments that
still needs to be undertaken to complete the project, K,suc h that when K  K, the
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rm invests at the maximum rate R, and there is no R&D investment otherwise.
As mentioned in the previous section, progress made in obtaining the innovation is very
unlikely to depend on the state of the overall economy. Thisim plies that iti s not
possible to replicate movements in dw with someot her assetsordy namic portfolio of
assets. Therefore wesol ve the R&D investment problem by using dynamic programming
in stead of contingentc laims analysis as was done in, e.g., Pindyck (1993).
To applydy namic programming we start by writing down the Bellman equation (see,










Due to Ito'sl emmaw e obtain that



















Because equation (8) is linear in I, the optimal R&D investment that maximizes F (K)
is always either zero or the maximum rate R:
I =
8<
: R for   1   F
0 + 1
2
2K2KF 00  0
0 otherwise:
(9)
Equation (8) therefore has a free boundary at a point K, such that I(t)= R when
K  K and I(t) = 0 otherwise. The value of K is found along with F (K)b ysol ving
(8) subject to the following boundary conditions.
First, the payo after completion is P ,sowhe n K =0w eha ve
F (0) = P: (10)
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Second, it holds that when K isv ery large, it is not protable to begint he project:
lim
K!1
F (K)=0 : (11)
As weha ve seen it is optimal to havez ero investment for K>K .F rom (8) we obtain
that then the value of the project F is zero as well. Thisc an be explainedb y the fact
that no new information about the project will be generated as longasthe re is no R&D
investment. So, if the rm at one time concludes that the project is too expensive for
performing R&D investments, this conclussion willal so be drawn in the future because
no investmenti mplies that K remains constant(c f. (3)), whichintur nim plies that
K remains larger than K.The refore, the rm forever refrains from investing so that
the project will never be completed. This leads to the conclusion that the value of the
projecteq uals zero. Now, the value matching condition, which requires that F should
be continuous in K ,be comes
F (K)=0 : (12)
Since F (K) = 0 for K>K ,w e know that F 0(K)e qualsze ro as well for K>K .
Therefore, the so-called smooth pasting condition (Dixit and Pindyck (1994)) equals
F 0(K)=0 : (13)
When K<K  and I = R, equation (8) is a second order ordinary dierential equation
that must be solved numerically together with the boundary conditions (10), (11), (12)
and (13). This is done for various parameter values in the remainder of this section.
Weha ve seen before that the rm invests maximally in R&D as long as the expected
total of R&D investments needed to complete the project, whichisde noted by K,isbe-
low K, and invests nothing otherwise. We conclude that the optimal R&D investment
policy isc ompletely xedb y K. Hence, in order to nd out in what way dierentpa-
rameterv aluesae ct R&D investments, it is sucienttode termine the relation between
K and these parameters.
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First, we study the eect of the overall uncertainty level on R&D investment. From
equation (3) we obtain that the parameter  determines the level of uncertainty; uncer-
tainty is particularly signicant when  is large. Hence to nd the eect of uncertainty
on R&D investments we must plot K against , which is done in Figure 1 for the pa-
rameter values r = 0:05; R = 2 and P = 10. We see that K has the lowest value when
uncertainty is absent. This value of K is obtained by applying the classical NPV rule.
When uncertainty comes in K increases so that for each  > 0 there exists an interval
of K-values where the classical NPV rule tells the rm to do nothing while it is in fact
optimal to invest maximally. The NPV rule also fails in other stochastic investment
models, and this forms the key message of a stream of recent contributions in which an
analogy with the theory of options in nancial markets is exploited in order to provide
a much richer dynamic framework than was possible within the traditional theory of
investment. An important exponent of this literature is Dixit and Pindyck (1994). In
these models investment decreases with uncertainty, because the presence of uncertainty
makes it valuable to wait for more information about, e.g., the price of output, before
committing yourself to an increased capital stock level.
[Place Figure 1 about here].
We conclude that usually investment decreases with uncertainty, while from Figure 1
we infer that in our model it is the other way round. The reason lies in the type of
uncertainty, which is technical uncertainty here rather than uncertainty about prices
and regulations. Therefore, in the rst place there is no value of waiting because new
information about the project arrives only when the rm invests. Second, if uncertainty
is large then there is a lot of uncertainty to be resolved which can be done by investing.
In other words, when R&D investment is undertaken the rm learns about how many
materials, manpower, etc., are required to complete the project, and the more uncertain
the rm is about these matters, the more there is to learn. Obtainment of this informa-
tion gives R&D investment an extra value beyond its contribution to completion of the
project. In absence of uncertainty this extra value is zero because everything is already
known. But the larger the uncertainty is, the larger the extra value will be, and, hence,
the more the rm will invest in R&D.
As explained in the previous section, for R&D problems in particular it holds that tech-
nical uncertainty is especially large in the starting phase of the project, thus when K is
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large. We modelled this by adding a term K in the uncertain part of the state equation
for K (cf. (3)). Hence, the larger is , the larger is the technical uncertainty during early
phases of the project. In Figure 2 it is shown in what way K depends on .
[Place Figure 2 about here].
We conclude that R&D investments increase with . This is for the same reason as
why investment increased with : if there is a lot of uncertainty, then much uncertainty
disappears when R&D investment is undertaken which gives a large extra value to R&D
investment. From Figure 2 we obtain that the parameter  has an enormous eect on
R&D investments: this eect is much larger than the eect of the overall uncertainty
parameter . Hence, ignoring  leads to a large underestimation of K, which in turn
would lead to too few R&D investments.
The implication of this is that it is usually optimal to spend some resources on exploring
opportunities that are completely new (thus having a large technical uncertainty) to
the rm. Based on the conclusions of this rst exploration phase the rm can decide
to continue or abandon the project. In this way the rm can detect those innovation
projects that at rst sight do not look as protable as they really are. It can be much
easier to complete an innovation than one would think beforehand. If the opposite is
true the rm can just stop investing before loosing too much money. Notice that  being
large implies that a lot of uncertainty is resolved during a rst exploration phase. This
is in contrast with the situation where  is large, because then uncertainty remains large
during the successive phases of the project.
Figure 3 shows how K depends on the discount rate for the case where uncertainty is
absent ( = 0) and  = 1. As we have just seen, R&D investment rises with increasing
uncertainty. This is conrmed in Figure 3 where K increases with  for a given value
of r.
[Place Figure 3 about here].
Looking at the two cases in Figure 3 we see that R&D investment is decreasing with the
discount rate. In the certainty case R&D investment takes place according to the NPV
rule, which implies that the rm invests maximally when the net present value of the






is non-negative2. The project's net present value falls when the discount rate rises and
this means that also R&D investment will fall, as is reected in Figure 3. From this
gure we can also conclude that this NPV eect carries over to the uncertainty case.
Summarizing the above, we conclude that an increasing discount rate has a negative
eect on R&D investment, because the project's net present value decreases with r.
In general an R&D project is entirely self nanced (Guerard, Bean and Andrews (1987)).
Reasons for this are that, rst, outsiders are reluctant to invest money in a project from
which the proceeds are very uncertain. Hence, to be able to borrow the rm must pay a
high interest rate to compensate the uncertainty, and this makes borrowing an unattrac-
tive means of nance. Second, the rm does not want to reveal information about an
R&D project to the outside world which must be done in case of external nancing
(Kamien and Schwartz (1982)). Therefore, it is likely that the availability of funds for
an R&D project is limited by the prot ow obtained from other operations within the
rm. Figure 4 shows in what way this nancing limit inuences the rm's R&D invest-
ment behavior in the certainty case as well as when uncertainty is present.
[Place Figure 4 about here].
When uncertainty is absent and K is below K, the completion time of the project is
K=R. This implies that when R is very large it is possible for the rm to complete the
innovation project almost immediately. Consequently, the optimal investment decision
is to invest when K falls below the project's payo P , and do nothing when K > P .
In Figure 4 this is conrmed by the fact that for  = 0 K approaches an horizontal
asymptote, situated at the level P = 10, from below as R increases.
When R is low the completion time is large and very sensitive to the level of R. This
implies that the project's net present value (see equation (14)) depends very heavily on
R too, so that the rm's optimal investment behavior changes very much with R. In
Figure 4 we see that a small increase of R leads to a large increase of K as long as
2Notice that the project's completion time is known when uncertainty is absent. It is T = K=R.
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the completion time K=R is more than approximately 41
2
years. We conclude that the
presence of a nancing limit is particularly sensitive to the level of R&D investment
when there is not much funds available.
Figure 4 shows that also in the uncertainty case it holds that the critical level K is
particularly sensitive to the level of the nancing limit when R is small. The dierence
with the certainty case is that K is much higher, especially when R is large. The
reason is that a lot of uncertainty is resolved when I is large (remember that I = R for
K < K). This gives a large extra value for R&D investment.
4 Model extensions
In this section we extend the basic model so that we can analyze the eects that three
characteristics, which are typical for an innovation project, have on optimal R&D in-
vestments of the rm. We start out with including investment grants in the model, and
proceed with studying the eects of spillover benets and a decreasing payo, respec-
tively.
4.1 R&D depending on the level of the investment grant rate.
Some governments have introduced investment grants as a means to stimulate R&D ac-
tivities by the rm. To see whether this nds conrmation in our model, it must turn
out that for some levels of K the rm will not invest in R&D without obtaining an
investment grant, while it will do so after investment grants are introduced. In other
words, it must be the case that K increases due to the introduction of an investment
grant.
If we denote the investment grant rate by g(0 < g < 1), the value of the innovation
opportunity, which in the basic model is given by equation (5), changes into












In this expression it is reected that if the R&D investment at time t equals I(t), the
government pays gI(t) to the rm so that the net R&D expenses of the rm equal
(1  g)I(t). The nancing restriction (4) implies that the maximum R&D investment at
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time t equals R=(1  g).
First, let us consider the deterministic case. As before a level of expected total of R&D
investments to be undertaken before completion K can be dened, above which it is
optimal not to invest and below which the rm invests maximally. This implies that for
K < K, K reduces with R=(1  g) per unit of time so that the completion time equals
(1  g)K=R. If we substitute this into (15) we can derive that










The critical level K can be determined by equating the marginal benet of R&D in-
vestment to its marginal cost:
 F 0(K) = 1  g: (17)











We conclude that (1   g)K is constant so that K is an increasing function of g. This
function is drawn in Figure 5, in which it is denoted by  = 0 (the certainty case). Note
that (1   g)K exactly equals the part of the accumulated R&D investment that must
be paid by the rm.
[Place Figure 5 about here].
In Figure 5 we also nd K as a function of g in case uncertainty is present, where
 = 1:0. It turns out that on this curve (1  g)K is increasing, which can be concluded
from the gure due to the fact that the curve for  = 1 lies above the dotted line on
which (1   g) (K jg=0;=1) is constant. The reason comes from the eect that g has on
the variance of dK when the rm invests maximally in R&D. Then I = R=(1   g) and
from eqn. (3) we obtain that for I = R=(1   g) it holds that
var(dK) = 2K2+1R=(1  g): (19)
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We conclude that var(dK) increases with g, which is due to the fact that I = R=(1  g)
increases with g, and the larger the R&D investment is, the more uncertain the rm is
about the outcome. If the level of uncertainty is large, then much uncertainty disap-
pears when R&D investment is undertaken, because, as already argued in Section 3, by
investing the rm learns about how much time and eort are needed to complete the
innovation project. This learning eect gives R&D investment an extra value beyond its
contribution to completion of the project and this extra value increases with the level
of uncertainty. This increased extra value is illustrated in Figure 5 where the distance
between the  = 1-curve and the dotted line increases with g, and thus with the variance
of dK.
We conclude that under uncertainty an R&D investment grant has two positive eects
on R&D investment. The rst eect is the obvious cost eect, i.e. the government pays
part of the investment. The second eect is the learning eect, i.e. donation of an
investment grant gives the rm the opportunity to increase R&D investments and the
more a rm can invest in R&D, the faster it can learn about the innovation project.
Of course, on the basis of this analysis we cannot conclude whether it pays for the
government to distribute such a grant to the rm. To answer this question requires
another model with the government as decision maker. Here we just focus on the optimal
response of a rm to an exogenously given government policy.
4.2 R&D depending on spillover benets.
Spillover benets are present when it is possible for the rm to take advantage of know-
ledge generated outside the rm by competitors or universities. In the case of R&D
rms will have diculty preventing their competitors from taking advantage of the more
general forms of scientic and engineering knowledge that are generated in the course of
developing some specic product or process. But, according to Grossman and Helpman
(1990) it is often necessary for the rm to invest resources in order to capture these
spillover benets from its competitors and/or from governmental institutions like uni-
versities. Therefore, below we assume that the rm can only take advantage of spillover
benets at moments that it invests in R&D.
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Of course, knowledge created outside the rm increases over time. If we denote the rate
of technological development outside the rm by w(w > 0 and constant) and refrain
form any uncertainties, the state equation for K becomes
dK(t) =  I(t)ewtdt: (20)
Hence, a given research outlay generates more cost reduction if this investment takes
place at a later point of time, because then it benets from the technological develop-
ment outside the rm up to this later point of time.
It is clear that the completion time of the R&D project becomes time dependent. There-
fore, the value of the innovation opportunity equals









The problem is to solve (21) subject to expressions (4), (20) and K(T (t)) = 0. Like
before the rm invests maximally in R&D if K is lower than a critical level, but this
level is now time dependent. We denote this critical level byK(t). Hence, forK < K(t)
the expected total of R&D investments still to be undertaken to complete the project
decreases with Rewt at time t, so that we obtain from (20) and K(T (t)) = 0:
Z T (t)
t
Rewsds = K(t): (22)











After substitution of (23) into (21) we get that






















(t); t) = 0: (25)














From equation (26) we conclude that K(t) grows exponentially over time. Hence, if at
present R&D investment is not optimal because K(t) is higher than K(t), it is still pos-
sible that investing becomes optimal later because of this exponential increase of K(t).
The intuition behind this is clear: by postponing the R&D investment to a later date the
investment generates more knowledge because then it takes advantage of the increased
technological development over time.
In order to study the eect of w on R&D investment, let us concentrate on the investment
decision at a particular time, say at t = 0. It is optimal to invest maximally in R&D
whenever K falls below K(0). To see in what way R&D investments depend on the






























At rst sight the sign of dK(0)=dw is not clear, since the rst term is negative and the
second term is positive. The second term is particularly important if P is large.
In Figure 6 it is depicted how K(0) depends on w, where the parameter values are
P = 10; R = 2; r = 0:05, and, since we study the certainty case,  = 0. We con-
clude that here R&D investments decrease with w. This can be explained by the fact
that knowledge creation due to a given research outlay increases over time with rate w.
Therefore, if w is large there is a strong incentive to postpone R&D investments, and
this of course negatively aects current investments. This result conrms the well known
motivation problem of R&D investments caused by spillover benets: an innovation cre-
ated by one rm provides usable information to other rms at little or no costs. While
all rms stand prepared to use such information, no one rm is willing to make the
investment necessary to produce it. A way to overcome this problem is granting patents
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for innovations, but this prevents the diusion of innovations which is undesirable from
a welfare point of view (Tirole (1988)).
[Place Figure 6 about here].
Apparently, under the parameter values of P;R and r that we used throughout the
whole paper and on which Figure 6 is based, the rst term of equation (27) dominates.
The second term becomes more inuential for higher values of P and it is interesting to
study for what values of P;K(0) increases with w. From Figure 7 we obtain that this
for instance happens when P = 1000 and w is suciently low. The economic intuition
behind this is that when the payo P is very large, the rm is very eager to obtain the
innovation. If w increases the rm nds a new perspective in the sense that it becomes
possible to obtain the innovation within a reasonable amount of time, despite of the fact
that K may be large. Therefore, R&D investments increase with w.
[Place Figure 7 about here].
For most sectors the rate of technological development w will lie somewhere between 0
and 0.1. The above gures show thatK(0) is very sensitive to w when w is low. We con-
clude that the rate of technological development plays an important role in determining
optimal R&D investment.
4.3 R&D when the payo decreases over time
In this subsection we determine the optimal R&D investment policy of the rm in case
the payo that accrues to the rm after the innovation project is completed, decreases
over time. This assumption is realistic for the following two reasons.
First, the sooner the rm completes the project the longer it captures monopoly rents.
Second, the number of competitors, that already has achieved the breakthrough in the
innovation process, will increase over time, implying that competition in the market of
the innovated product also increases over time.
As in the previous subsection we simplify the analysis by refraining from any uncertain-
ties. Let us assume that the payo declines at the rate of v (v > 0 and constant) over
time, so that the rm receives Pe vt if the project is completed at time t. This gradual
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decrease of the payo diers from Reinganum (1982), where it was assumed that the
innovation payo is constant up to a particular point of time after which it is zero. Our
assumption captures the above reasons for a decreasing payo in a better way.
The value of the innovation opportunity becomes









The problem is to solve (28) subject to expressions (1) (with  = 0), (2), and
K(T (t)) = 0.
Since the payo is a function of time, the same holds for the critical level K(t). If
K(t) < K(t) the project will be completed by time
T (t) = t+K=R: (29)
Substitution of (29) into (28) eventually leads to





Again we obtainK by equating marginal benets of R&D investment ( FK) to marginal
expenses (1):
 1  FK (K
(t); t) = 0: (31)











K(0) has the same value as the critical level in the basic model. To see how K(t)




















Hence, K(t) decreases over time in a convex way. The reduction of the payo over time
makes it less tempting to perform R&D investments as time passes.
In order to be sure that also here it is optimal that the rm invests maximally in case
K(t) < K(t), it needs to be true that once K(t) is below K(t), it remains below K(t).
Otherwise, the R&D investment at time t is waisted down the drain, because the inno-
vation project will never be completed. This is because at the moment that K > K the
rm stops investment, which implies that K remains constant (remember that  = 0).
Since K is decreasing the inequality K > K continues to hold so that the rm will
never resume investment. The following proposition shows under what parameter values
the above described investment rule is still optimal. Here it is important to notice that
the rm will never invest in the innovation project if K(0) > K(0).
Proposition 1.
Consider the investment rule I(t) = R when K(t)  K(t), and I(t) = 0 otherwise.
When this rule is applied and K(0)  K(0), then it holds for every t > 0 that K(t)
remains below K(t) when the parameter values satisfy the following inequality:
R
P
+ r > v: (35)
Proof
See Appendix.



















We conclude that a heavy payo reduction, i.e. v large, leads to a large decrease of K(t)
on an initial time interval.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we studied optimal R&D investment behavior of a single rm. An R&D
project takes time to complete and the amount of eort, materials and time needed
to obtain the innovation is in general uncertain. It may in fact not even be possible
to realize the project at all. Because of this uncertainty, the fact that most assets are
intangible, and that the rm is reluctant to reveal any project information to outsiders,
R&D projects are usually nanced by retained earnings of the rm. These features are
all captured in our model.
The model is based on Pindyck (1993), in which sequential investment programs under
cost uncertainty were studied. We changed some of the features of Pindyck's model so
that it became more suitable for studying R&D investments. For R&D projects it holds
that technical uncertainty is far more important than input cost uncertainty, and this
technical uncertainty is especially signicant when the project is far from being com-
pleted. Therefore, compared to Pindyck (1993), we left out input cost uncertainty, and
we made technical uncertainty larger during earlier phases of the project in stead of
uncertainty being the same for all phases as was the case in Pindyck (1993). Inclusion
of this last feature turned out to have a large positive impact on R&D investments.
Like Pindyck (1993), Kanniainen (1993), and Grossman and Shapiro (1986), we also
found that R&D investment increases with uncertainty. The reason is that by investing
the rm gets more information about the actual total of investments that needs to be
undertaken to nish the project. Generating this extra information gives an extra value
to investing. Notice that in the certainty case everything is known beforehand so that
then the extra value is zero, because there is no extra information to be gained.
In Kanniainen (1993) the R&D process generates an immediate return in the form of
increased productivity of the capital stock. This is contrary to our approach, where it
takes time to complete an R&D project and a payo is only obtained after completion.
In Grossmann and Shapiro (1986) R&D investments have decreasing returns and there
is no nancing limit, while in our model investments have constant returns and the
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investment rate cannot exceed the upperbound that comes from the fact that R&D is
nanced by retained earnings. Consequently, in Grossmann and Shapiro (1986) the rate
of investment diers over time, while in our solution the rm either invests maximally
in R&D or invests nothing at all.
Furthermore, we studied the eects of investment grants, spillover benets, and a de-
creasing payo on R&D investments. Besides the obvious decreasing cost eect, a second
positive eect of investment grants is caused by additional learning. The presence of in-
vestment grants makes it possible for the rm to increase its investment rate, and the
higher this investment rate, the faster it can learn about the R&D project. Spillover
benets give the rm an incentive to postpone R&D investments, because when the rm
invests later it generates a higher return due to the overall technological development.
However, in case of a very large payo and spillover benets it can be optimal to un-
dertake R&D investments, while without spillover benets it would be optimal to invest
nothing at all. This is because spillover benets give the rm the opportunity to com-
plete a project without needing to use too many resources. As time passes, more other
rms will obtain the innovation that the rm is working on. Therefore, the payo of an
R&D project will in general decrease over time. This causes the rm to decrease R&D
investments as time passes.
An interesting topic for future research would be to relax the assumption that the prot
ow obtained from other operations within the rm is constant. Then we could analyze
whether it would pay for the rm to delay investment in R&D for an initial interval of
time in order to accumulate retained prots and then to invest more agressively. It seems
that in real world rms do in fact sometimes resort to such an investment strategy.
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Appendix
In this appendix the proof of Proposition 1 is given.
First, notice that if it holds that K(t) < K(t) 8 t > 0 when K(0) = K(0), then this
will also hold for K(0) < K(0). So, let us depart from the situation that
K(0) = K(0): (38)











K(t) < K(t) 8 t > 0 implies that I(t) = R. If we substitute this into (3) (with  = 0)
we obtain by using (39):
























If we denote the left-hand side of (41) by f(t), we can rewrite (38) as
f(0) = 0: (42)
From (41) we obtain that
f 0(t) =  r + v=(1 +Revt=rP ): (43)
Satisfaction of (41) requires that f 0(0) < 0 which is the case under expression (35). If
(35) holds, we get from (43) that f 0(t) < 0 8 t > 0 as well. And this in turn implies
that (41) holds 8 t > 0. Q.e.d.
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The critical levelK as function of  under the parameter values  = 0:1; r = 0:05; R = 2
and P = 10.
Figure 2:
The critical level K as function of  under the parameter values  = 1; r = 0:05; R = 2
and P = 10.
Figure 3:
The critical level K as function of the discount rate r for  = 0 and  = 1, where
 = 0:1; R = 2 and P = 10.
Figure 4:
The critical level K as function of the upper nancing limit R for  = 0 and  = 1,
where  = 0:1; r = 0:05 and P = 10.
Figure 5:
The critical level K as function of the investment grant rate g for  = 0 and  = 1,
where  = 0:1; R = 2; r = 0:05 and P = 10. The dotted line is drawn such that
(1  g) (K jg=0;=1) is constant.
Figure 6:
The critical level K(0) as function of the rate of technological development outside the
rm w, where P = 10; R = 2; r = 0:05 and  = 0.
Figure 7:
The critical level K(0) as function of the rate of technological development outside the
rm w for P = 100 and P = 1000, where R = 2; r = 0:05 and  = 0.
